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Montenegro’s Mediatization of Politics: 




The paper examines the media’s moulding of political communication in the 
Montenegrin’s 2016 parliamentary election campaign. Habermas’ view of the 
interrelation of commercial media and the state provides the background for the 
examination of the tension between media and political logic. It is a political 
confl ict where the winner makes the rules of society. Mediatization of politics is 
the result of this confl ict, and commercial media logic is shown as based on the 
market actors’ interests. The media belong to the civil society; therefore, the 
article introduces a normative aspect of media logic, which reconstructs the 
political confrontation. The paper then turns to Montenegro’s social context. 
While the mediatization of politics needs a critical upgrade in the case of devel-
oped countries, in less stable states social contradictions should infl uence me-
dia logic the way Reinhart Koselleck’s theory suggests. Koselleck’s thesis is that 
the Enlightenment’s critique, embodied in the commercial media of Habermas’ 
liberal public sphere, produced the crisis of the absolutist state, whose purpose 
was stopping the European civil wars. It created a path to new social confl icts 
and the disorganization of civil society. Montenegro’s multi-ethnic, post-social-
ist society in the process of neoliberal transition is complementary to Koselleck’s 
pathogenesis of modernity. Citizens handled social insecurities by rehabilitat-
ing the absolutist principle. Comparative frame analysis of commercial RTV 
Vijesti and the public service RTCG found the principles of Enlightenment and 
Absolutism in media logic of both channels, which excluded political parallel-
ism as the only possible cause. Vijesti, steered by audience involvement, repre-
sented Milo Đukanović both as a tyrant and as a guarantor of social stability. 
* Nikola Mlađenović, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade, 
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Instead of neoliberal policies, Vijesti defended the public sector. It embraced 
both the Enlightenment’s critique and left wing statolatry. Integration of Haber-
mas’ and Koselleck’s theory with mediatization of politics was therefore proved 
adequate.
Key words:  mediatization, political communication, media logic, election cam-
paign, public sphere
Introduction
The concept of mediatization is used for the analysis of the interrelation between 
media/communication and social/cultural change (Lundy, 2014: 19). It allows us to 
describe the media’s moulding of social interactions (McQuail, 2010: 563), and 
therefore political communication. But how dialectical mediatization really is? 
Even though mediatization should theorize the interplay of the media, society and 
culture (Hepp, Hjarvard & Lundby, 2015), it is usually reduced to a theory of the 
media’s infl uence on the society. The media are examined primarily as an independ-
ent variable (Mazzoleni, 2008), and the interplay is neglected. Researchers often 
avoid theorizing the historical context because of regional differences, but maybe 
we need a more complex theory than the linear relationship between media and 
political logic?
We will try to examine the critical defi cit of mediatization (Krotz, 2014: 156). Crit-
ical theory’s premises could reconstruct mediatization of politics: critique of value 
neutrality, domination, social struggles, ideology, critique of political economy, as 
well as questions of emancipation and de-reifi cation (Fuchs, 2013: 13). Critical me-
diatization of politics must embrace the paradigm of social confl ict and examine the 
historical background of ideological domination. Mediatization is a contextually 
sensitive process (Peruško, 2017). However, the critical aspects of the context can-
not be so different so that we would need to avoid theorizing the interplay. Actually, 
globalization and mediatization are meta-processes, therefore, the context is not just 
local.
The fi rst section shows that the context can be theorized and universally applied. 
Habermas understands the relation of commercial media and the state as a political 
confrontation. Mediatization of politics results in the triumph of the commercial 
logic, which belongs to the one side of the confl ict. Its unilateral nature should be 
overcome by a public communication media logic. Media are civil society actors 
positioned between the market and the state. Second section turns to Reinhart Ko-
selleck’s theory in order to conceptualize the Balkan context, although I believe it is 
applicable to Brexit’s UK and Trump’s USA too. The developed world is also a fi eld 
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of neoliberal transition and ethnic confl icts. Mediatization theory needs to integrate 
the critical paradigm in order to examine the countries with signifi cant social 
 contradictions.
There are many states whose experience is complementary to Koselleck’s portrayal 
of social disorganization. The Enlightenment’s critique, embodied by the commer-
cial media of Habermas’ liberal public, identifi ed the absolutist government with 
corruption and hypocrisy. It forgot that absolutism was a method of stopping civil 
confl ict. Citizens today seek to resolve the crisis through the state. As the public, 
they supplement the commercial, the Enlightenment’s media logic, with the abso-
lutist principle. I will demonstrate this on a case study of Montenegrin parliamen-
tary election.
Comparative frame analysis of RTV Vijesti and RTCG campaign coverage will 
show what interpretations were emphasized and what worldview was constructed 
on the basis of specifi c Montenegro’s media logic. The research is focused on the 
evening TV news shows of commercial RTV Vijesti and public service RTCG. I 
will seek both critical aspects and the interplay of Enlightenment and Absolutist 
principles in the media narratives. The frames of confl ict and economic consequenc-
es, as well as treatment of raison d’être, personifi ed in the most important Montene-
grin politician Milo Đukanović, will be my main guidelines. The narrative tech-
niques that connect the disorganized civil society and absolutist solution to the crisis 
will confi rm the validity of Koselleck’s theory for the study of mediatization of 
politics.
Critical mediatization of politics
Mediatization of politics implies an independence of the media from political insti-
tutions, due to commercialization and the development of media professionalism 
(Stromback, 2008: 242). For Stromback, the public service is not seen as a part of 
mediatization but could actually “reverse the process”. However, Hjarvard (2013: 
49) argues that public services are cultural institutions that lay the groundwork for 
the media’s institutionalization. That is, the autonomy of institutions does not de-
pend on commercialization (Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 289). Therefore, Hjarvard 
(2013: 26) uses media professionalism and user/audience involvement to describe 
media logic, whichcan lead to a different kind of mediatization.
The logic indicates which actors routinely perform to achieve the purpose of the 
institution, its interests and values - one’s modus operandi. Political logic has been 
associated with power allocation, deliberation, partisanship, responsibility, policy 
and implementation (Landerer 2013: 246). For Esser and Stromback (2014: 16) it 
has three constituents: politics, polity and policy; and the fi rst one is the most vul-
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nerable to mediatization. Polity and policy, as the rules of the political system and 
the problem solving/creating area, seem less affected by the media logic. Esser and 
Stromback fi nd that the purpose of the fi rst constituent is in publicity and power 
gaining. However, the political subsystem is not the only one carrying these func-
tions. Power is present in the whole society, and deliberation belongs to all citizens. 
Deliberation about policy and polity.
Critical theory connects the problem of power to social confl icts. In order to allocate 
power or implement a policy, people’s interests and values collide and the media 
become a fi eld of struggle. Commercial media have a special interest in this strug-
gle. As Habermas (1989: 69) shows, the public sphere is created by entrepreneurs in 
order to criticize the state. In the liberal period there was a tension between the ris-
ing bourgeoisie and absolutist state, the new economic power and a fi nancially de-
pendent and fading power. Public sphere was a place of “political confrontation… 
against the public authorities themselves, to engage them in a debate over the gen-
eral rules governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere 
of commodity exchange and social labor” (Ibid: 27).
Mediatization was the result of this political confrontation. Commercialization es-
tablished the media autonomy with a specifi c task: setting up social and market rules 
and reconstructing the polity. Mediatization of politics is refl ected in the “tension-
charged fi eld in which authority and publicity (as the principle of critical control of 
the cabinets) confronted each other” (Ibid: 73). There was never a universal public 
sphere, only particular private interests. Public sphere’s constructed universality 
hides ideological domination. Mediatization is therefore political in itself. It is not a 
deviation that taints the normative political logic (Landerer, 2013: 251).It rather has 
to be explained as a part of political confrontation. We should not forget commercial 
media logic came with deregulation, which was a political decision. Public services 
are not the defenders of political logic, but instead they belong to the civil society. 
They have a public purpose, a logic that belongs to neither political nor commercial 
logic.
However, that is not entirely connected to the ownership structure. Commercial 
media could serve a public purpose too. There are two ideal models of the media: 
the theatrical and public communication model (Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995: 51). 
The fi rst is inclined to dramatic confl icts and not focused on serious issues (polity/
policy) but on spectacular struggles. Public communication model should show rea-
sonable care for citizens’ interests. Expert opinion and debates should carry more 
weight. There is no reason that the idea of public communication should be consid-
ered as reversion of mediatization. The view that the media logic can only be com-
mercial is an ideological construction that hides political confrontation of authority 
and publicity.
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Pathogenesis of the Balkans
If the media is driven by the audience, the experience of the citizens determines 
their participation in the media system. Their experience is marked by socialism, 
civil war and current neoliberal transition. First, “socialistically expanded public 
sphere”(Habermas, 1989: 128) is not entirely gone. Even commercial media have to 
adapt to the fact that the memory of the worker’s participation in the public sphere 
is still alive. The market actors cannot just impose the rules, and commercial media 
cannot solely maintain a pro-corporate position. Actually, media have to serve the 
audience. And non-owners have different socio-economic demands.
Disappointment with socialism is therefore ambivalent. Although socialism did not 
meet expectations, neoliberalism failed too. The Montenegrin experience is there-
fore Hegelian. Private owners constructed their particular interests as general inter-
ests, which in turn created even more antagonisms and inequality. Hegel saw an 
“unorganized opinion”, the sum of individual interests that lead to “a powerful bloc 
in opposition to the organized state” (Ibid: 119). In the Balkans, when each party has 
its own view of the truth and justice, this parallels the situation of Hobbesian wars. 
Zoran Đinđić (1997: 12) points to the importance of “integration of all sides of war. 
It could be done only by suspending the contents that create conditions for constant 
renewal of social confl icts... The power that breaks its opponents, in order to estab-
lish social peace, is the absolutist state”.
The absolutist state was a solution to the civil war, a guarantor of stability (Ko-
selleck, 1988: 16). Citizens identifi ed change with terror and order with the state. 
“The civil war that was experienced as a threat to life came to rest in the state… a 
mortal god” (Ibid: 32). In the 18th century, the state was confronted with Enlighten-
ment, a Habermas’ liberal public. Koselleck’s thesis is that the Enlightenment’s cri-
tique of absolutism due to corruption, religious hypocrisy and the desire to change 
the social and market rules, removed the privilege and taboos along with guarantees 
for social peace. Critique, therefore, led to social confl ict and the crisis of moder-
nity. From that perspective, Balkan’s nationalisms are not just irrational and de-
structive but also have a stabilizing function.
This should change our perception of mediatization of politics. It is not just a con-
frontation of authority and publicity but also a reconstitution of the Hobbes’ civil 
war. Especially in multi-ethnic Montenegro civil confl ict has a class, religious and 
ethnic aspect. The danger of apparent or real confl ict gives symbolic legitimacy to 
the absolutist principle. States today can hardly be absolutist like pre-revolutionary 
France, but the attitude of citizens towards the state is complementary to Koselleck’s 
(1988: 18) description: “Forbearance, it proclaimed, was more dangerous than strin-
gency, more than cruelty even, for the consequences of clemency were bloodier and 
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more devastating than those of instant severity”; the monarch “must subjugate all or 
no one would be subjugated. The sovereign’s responsibility required and presup-
posed his absolute domination of all subjects”.
This is a paradox. The utopian thinking created social contradictions that lead to a 
crisis. “They encourage moral judgement over the world because they believe the 
logic of history is on their side” (Đinđić, 1997: 20). Crisis is a path towards a better 
future. The Balkan nations have seen through this in their own specifi c and contra-
dictory way. They are aware of the bad rulers but are sceptical of change. “In the 
eyes of the hypocritical proponent of Enlightenment power is identical with abuse 
of power… a good monarch was worse than an evil one because he prevented the 
oppressed multitudes from seeing the injustice of the Absolutist principle. The En-
lightenment unmasked the King as man, and as man he could be nothing but a 
usurper… a brutal tyrant” (Koselleck, 1988: 119).
Hegel’s answer was that the state should organize particular interests to prevent 
disorganization of the civil society and accumulation of inequality. Subjective opin-
ions should be integrated into an objectivity, a state, from above (Habermas, 1989: 
120), because the liberal public is naturally destructive. Certainly, these are ideal 
types. Few countries are really apologetic of absolutism and consider the Enlighten-
ment abnormal. The average citizen does not despise the liberal public. No one 
wants to live in a corrupt state. However, legitimizing the absolutist principle is not 
merely a goal of state offi cials, but at least a subconscious reaction of citizens due 
to crisis.
Media frames
Maybe media logic should be examined primarily through content: selection, cate-
gorization and presentation of information (Hjarvard, 2008: 107). The theatrical 
and public communication model process the information differently. The fi rst one 
simplifi es, polarizes and intensifi es the event. Its model of reality is highly stereo-
typical (Landerer, 2013: 243). According to Todd Gitlin, “news concerns the event, 
not the underlying condition; the person, not the group; confl ict, not consensus; the 
fact that ‘advances the story’, not the one that explains it” (Castells, 2010: 379). Be-
ing profi t-oriented, its content seeks to fi nd a large audience, but also to impose the 
social/market rules that serve the commercial media best. On the other hand, the 
aforementioned model of public communication will not avoid complex and ab-
stract issues, it will fact-check information and provide explanation. It will also 
monitor the political actors through political commentary (Hjarvard, 2013: 73).
It means that the content is always ideological. It frames certain issues according to 
the interests of the market, political or civil society actors. Framing is the process of 
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“selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections 
among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solu-
tion” (Entman, 2003: 417, my emphasis). Frames organize the message through 
noticeable and emotionally charged words (Castells, 2009: 158). Prominent media 
frames are human interest story, confl ict frame and economic consequences frame 
(de Vreese, 2014: 143). Human interest story can bring certain political processes 
closer to citizens, so that politicians cannot implement abstract decisions that would 
affect people’s lives without people’s conscious consent. Of course, if we have in 
mind the political confrontation, this is a way for the market actors to use emotional 
narrative for their own interests. Therefore, confl ict is not just within the confl ict 
frame, even though facing dishonest antagonists is the best way to send the desired 
message (Mazzoleni, 2014: 48). Confl ict frame presents different opinions and is 
often intertwined with economic consequences frame, because politicians always 
fi nd someone else’s platform bad for citizens. With a more balanced account of rival 
parties, the public communication media model could provide the audience with a 
full report.
We should acknowledge that this harmonistic doctrine is another ideological con-
struct. Balanced reporting does not produce the truth. Political commentary does not 
seek balance. Media coverage never follows these ideal frames perfectly, especially 
in developing countries. The political confrontation is still there. Commercial media 
logic, driven by profi t, infl uences the policy-making with its infotainment approach. 
All political affairs are seen as equally destructive for the social order, which can 
create an attitude of permanently corrupt political system (Blumler, 2014: 37). This 
is what market actors actually want – to propose the roll-back of the welfare state 
due to corruption. However, as we shall see, the commercial media in Montenegro 
do not do everything previously mentioned. RTV Vijesti does not seek to neoliberal-
ize the state, which would be a goal of entirely profi t-oriented media. Comparative 
frame analysis of these practices should show a specifi c Montenegrin formula. 
There are many other ways to frame the message, to reconnect specifi c parts of 
events or issues so they could be interpreted in a particular way. Framing is there-
fore twofold, as choosing the words for public to think with, but also as a promotion 
of a certain form of thinking. The media do not just reduce the object of thinking but 
manipulate our way of thinking as well.
Methodological remarks
I will follow the theoretical framework and present the campaign thematically. I will 
examine twelve TV news show episodes both for RTV Vijesti (“Vijesti u 18:30”) 
and RTCG (”Dnevnik 2”, 7.30 p.m.), in the period between 3rd and 14th October 
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2016, which were the fi nal days of the campaign (election day October 16th). Sev-
enteen parties and coalitions participated in the parliamentary election and, apart 
from minorities, only six gained the seats in the parliament. Democratic Party of 
Socialists (DPS) maintained the leading position (36 out of 81 seats) and formed the 
new government with the help of minorities and its partner Social Democrats (SD). 
Opposition parties (Democratic Front, Key Coalition, Democrats and Social Demo-
cratic Party) continued to express a longstanding critique that DPS uses the state’s 
resources to control the outcome of the election. This includes RTCG as a state re-
source. RTCG is indeed facing pressure from the political system, and its director 
could be relieved of his duties while this paper is in print, but the frame analysis of 
both commercial Vijesti, an independent media organization for decades, and the 
RTCG public service, does not provide enough evidence that clientelism is a suffi -
cient explanation of DPS’ election success.
If we follow Hjarvard’s idea that media professionalism and audience involvement 
steer the media content production, we have to acknowledge that the audience 
around the world is populist and therefore seeking a secure environment and a 
strong leader, a state that could protect them from neoliberal globalization. The 
themes that are chosen by editors, and frames in which they are presented, show 
these concerns of ordinary people. It shows that polity questions are what citizens 
are most interested in. Kosseleck’s narrative, that confl ictual content has to be sus-
pended, that absolute power has to break its opponents, is at the narrative heart of 
media logic in the Montenegro’s case study. For Andreas Hepp (2013: 144), media-
tization research has to have in mind the relation between power and cultural pat-
terns, because media culture is a fi eld where ideological hegemony is constructed. 
Therefore, the critical interpretative approach is highly qualitative and multi-per-
spectivist, because media’s texts “require methods of reading and critique that ar-
ticulate their embeddedness in the political economy, social relations, and the po-
litical environment within which they are produced, circulated, and received” (Kell-
ner, 1995: 4, my emphasis).
Campaign’s Frames
The most important message of the election was the state and its future develop-
ment. Every problem refers to the state. The opposition presented it as a continua-
tion of corruption and criminal activity under dictatorship, while the government 
insisted on stability and police intervention in case of electoral turmoil and attempt 
to seize power on the streets. Whether the state is really that corrupted or its oppo-
nents are really dangerous is beyond the scope of this paper. Actually, critical frame 
analysis presented here advances an argument that fi nds both questions irrelevant 
for the fi nal outcome of the election. For the sake of this analysis, these are just nar-
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rative techniques that construct the idea of a corrupted country or the state under 
attack, and as such they infl uence the public. That is, the opposition used the usual 
neoliberal narrative of the state’s corruption, while the offi cial relied on an absolut-
ist rethoric. Future Prime Minister Duško Marković said the state will maintain law 
and order (Vijesti 04.10.), although the Interior Minister Goran Danilović (opposi-
tion’s representative in the “government of electoral trust”)1 argued turmoil allega-
tions were false and a part of an emotionally charged campaign (Vijesti 03.10.). 
Actually, according to the leaders of DF, the opposition is preparing a celebration of 
victory, not violent protests. However, Marković was not covered in the frame of 
confl ict, while Danilović’s assertion stands opposed to the police director’s state-
ment about possible unrest during the elections. That is, the frame of confl ict is on 
screen until a higher offi cial gives a statement. Vijesti covered the issue as a confl ict 
between the police director and opposition leaders, while Marković’s statement was 
shown later in a different segment of the programme.
The public service presented the campaign differently, though. While Vijesti (03.10.) 
accentuated the possible dangerous unrest and offi cial statements that some hypo-
thetical chaos will be stopped, RTCG (3.10.) chose more abstract terms of sacrifi c-
ing national interests, which do not have to imply any kind of street riots. The lead-
ing party wanted to portray the opposition as enemies of the state and not just of the 
leading party’s programme. The message is actually addressed to the people that 
allegedly work for foreign governments and want to stop Montenegro’s progress 
(Vijesti 07.10.). RTCG does not follow Vijesti’s frame. It is not just about foreign 
interference. DPS was always at the forefront of change and it will never create a 
“quagmire of power”, because the new leadership would not be progressive (RTCG 
07.10.): they would sacrifi ce the socialist heritage. Their opponents are just some 
“village scoundrel” Milan Knežević and “chetnik duke” Andrija Mandić (both radi-
cal opposition - Democratic Front), ideological descendants of those who murdered 
the communist national hero Ljubo Čupić (Vijesti 10.12.). Even though we could 
argue DPS is not a leftist party, it represented itself as such. It relied on both nation-
alist and leftist framing, and this was accentuated on Vijesti.
RTCG (12.10.) shows a less provocative Đukanović, who says he does not see any-
thing patriotic or knightly in his opponents, who are probably guided by foreign 
people’s money. That is similar to Trump’s case, where the American commercial 
media focused on his statements how China is “raping” the USA or that the Wall 
will stop the criminals from coming to the USA, while the public TV PBS translated 
1 Several months before the election, three oppositional parties (SDP, and future Key’s 
members URA and DEMOS) became a part of DPS’ government in order to control the use 
of state resources, which they believed is the greatest cause of DPS’ election victories 
for decades.
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that into a critique of globalization and bringing back the jobs from abroad. This is 
repeated in Montenegro’s case when Vijesti (14.10.) strongly connected the seizure 
of a small number of illegal weapons with possible unrests, while RTCG (14.10.) 
showed less interest in this story and presented only Danilović’s contention that 
there is no need to sow fear and that everything will be all right. It turns out the 
story about some future riots was more pronounced on Vijesti, which corresponds 
to its commercial logic. Whether it is the corruption of the offi cials, possible riots or 
preserving socialist heritage, itis Vijesti’s commercial lens that always highlights 
certain features of events or issues to make them more confl ictual. The goal is to get 
more audience, but the result is an imaginary construction of an endangered state.
Vijesti was higlighting the coruption, antagonism, possible unrest and caution about 
electoral fraud. Apparently, the police plan to put pressure on citizens in order to 
manipulate the will of the people (Vijesti 03.10.). First, Danilović suspected the 
electoral register had many doubles (Vijesti, RTCG 04.10.) and refused to approve 
it for the election (05.10.). Then the Democratic Front appeared with a claim that 
Bulgarian mafi a was creating an army of voters made of foreigners with fake docu-
ments that would support DPS (Vijesti 11.10.). RTCG does not mention Front spe-
cifi cally but presents it as “media allegations of some parties”, which will be dealt 
with by the special prosecutor. Prime Minister Đukanović closes the segment by 
saying that those are “old charges” that were never proven true. Vijesti (12.10) also 
found questionable the organization in Gusinje, where DPS activists offered stu-
dents to pay for them to come home on election day and offered some convicts to 
get an early release in exchange for their votes. Finally, NGO “MANS” showed a 
recording of a telephone conversation about possible vote buying. MANS claimed 
there was a massive abuse of state funds for election campaigning (Vijesti 13.10.). 
RTCG broadcasted only the second part of the controversy. TheGovernment denied 
the charges a day later. We can see that Vijesti always intensify the events. Whether 
it is the riot or the fraud, one helping the leading party’s and another the opposition 
parties’ campaigns, the commercial media is always portraying the incidents as 
large as possible, while RTCG has a milder approach.
The economy was shifted aside and came into focus only within the framework of 
general state of affairs. Ranko Krivokapić (SDP) focused on the dangers of the 
“Plunder of Montenegro”, implying some politicians want to own the state, while he 
wants to be its servant (RTCG, Vijesti 03.10.). Both channels showed some level of 
concern about the privatization of state property and possible corruption of the peo-
ple involved (05.10.). However, Vijesti (07:10.) allowed the opposition to attack the 
offi cials for their irresponsible behaviour and possible involvement of Đukanović’s 
family members in the alleged looting of the state. The fi rst thing that was aired on 
Vijesti’s news programme were news stories such as secret auctions of state’s prop-
erty (07.10.), worker protests in front of the Government’s building (10.10.) or the 
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privatization of healthcare (12.10.). RTCG focused on more abstract messages, 
mostly made by Krivokapić, about how even the strongest will surrender to the rule 
of law, and that harmful privatizations will be examined (Vijesti, RTCG 09.10.). 
The new government would make DPS-friendly companies pay their tax debts 
(RTCG 12.10.), because the state is not a shelter for such people but a “sanctity” for 
everyone (Vijesti, RTCG, 14.10.).
That is, both channels covered the potential “plunder”, and opposition candidates’ 
calls for a war on corruption and crime were not signifi cantly overlooked by the 
public service, but only covered in more abstract terms. Opposition statements on 
RTCG were more generalized, rarely personalized, but they were present nonethe-
less. Both commercial and public television considered corruption a major problem. 
When an issue is framed as a thing that could hurt the state itself, both commercial 
and public television channel will respond to that. The difference was not in what 
was said but the manner of the statement, the selection of the terms. Vijesti (03.10.) 
presented opposition claims that Đukanović and Marković would certainly go to jail 
after the elections, where their “mate” Svetozar Marović already resides. RTCG 
(03.10.), on the other hand, focused on general announcements of the war on mafi a 
and organized crime, but not on the people behind it. The only exception is when 
Marković called the opposition leader a “loan shark” (Medojević, DF). After that, 
DPS appeared more cautious even in the commercial TV news.
In fact, opposition attacks were primarily directed against Đukanović, “the godfa-
ther” of the “organized criminal group” in Budva (Vijesti 06.10.). RTCG (04.10) 
covered moderate criticism, such as that the Prime Minister is not in touch with real-
ity and wants to portray life in Montenegro as better than it is. Personalized criti-
cism was a commercial news trait. Đukanović is a “true patriot of his own pocket” 
(Vijesti 08.10.), whose associates are buying state’s property (09.10.). He is the 
most responsible person for the bad political decisions, crime growth and corrup-
tion. The opposition leaders were sending very emotionally charged accusations 
against Đukanović, which provided a scandalous infotainment content on Vijesti. 
Those kinds of statements, where the opposition leaders became very personal and 
talked directly to Đukanović, e.g. that he could face charges after the change of the 
state’s leadership, created a great polarization among the voters, and this tension 
was maintained on Vijesti until the end of the campaign. Commercial TV did not 
seek a way to reconcile the confl ict between the leading party and the opposition, 
but it did exactly that within the opposition itself.
Đukanović was a target throughout the campaign, but he was “saved” by a strange 
confrontation among the opposition leaders. After the arrival of the American dip-
lomat, Front expressed concern that the new government would be formed in the US 
Embassy. Front called on the Key coalition to reject the plans of NATO countries 
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(RTCG 03.10.). Key shied away from inter-oppositional confl ict at fi rst, because 
“all our voters are victims” (Vijesti 04.10.). Front demanded from the Key to guar-
antee they would not vote for a NATO membership and absolve Đukanović of his 
crimes (Vijesti 05.10.) and offered an agreement for Key leaders to sign (RTCG, 
Vijesti 06.10.). Even the third opposition actor, the Democrats, gave a statement that 
it is “monstrous” to accuse them of potentially forming a coalition with DPS and 
betraying other parties (Vijesti 06.10). Vijesti showed this in a frame of confl ict 
until the leaders reconciled. Afterwards Vijesti (09.10) easily switched to celebrat-
ing the upcoming election victory of the unifi ed opposition (Vijesti 09.10). How-
ever, RTCG did not really fi nd this confrontation interesting. It was the only one 
presented without the frame of confl ict. Sometimes, the coverage of Front was about 
women’s working rights and not about the possible coalition of DPS and Key 
(RTCG 07.10.). Instead of opposition rejoicing, RTCG showed only a short state-
ment by Miodrag Lekić (Key) that the new government will be formed without 
Đukanović.
It seemed at fi rst RTCG ignored the united opposition force because it was over-
whelmed by political logic, while Vijesti could not stop celebrating the ruling par-
ty’s imminent defeat. On the contrary, Vijesti made Đukanović’s job easier. By fo-
cusing on an inter-oppositional confl ict and its subsequent reconciliation, Vijesti 
emphasized that the Front, the most radical DPS’ opponent, is leading the entire 
opposition. Đukanović could now identify all his opponents within the Democratic 
Front, which was already presumed to be a Russian agency in Montenegro. Now 
everyone in the opposition for Đukanović lacks vision and would not know what to 
do with power if they acquired it and would sell the country’s independence for a 
handful of Russian rubles (Vijesti 08.10.). They all wanted to induce Montenegro’s 
bankruptcy and prevent its NATO application (RTCG 08.10.). Đukanović’s answer 
to Key’s claim that the system protects the crooks is actually an answer to the Front: 
they are the fi fth column that will auction Montenegro for the crumbs from the Rus-
sian table (Vijesti 09.10.). Vijesti emphasized this confl ict, which RTCG couldn not 
because of avoiding the frame. Vijesti (10.10.) stressed the opposition warnings 
about turning the country into North Korea andpromising the rule of “Kim Jong 
Milo” to be over. This was accompanied by Đukanović’s assertion that now, before 
joining NATO, national values are under the most dangerous and powerful attack 
ever, but the state will preserve stability and economic development.
RTCG allowed another personalization with Key leaders’ claims Đukanović will 
help Montenegro with his departure, or that he could have been de Gaulle but chose 
the role of Sanader instead (Vijesti, RTCG 10.11.). However, this is an exception 
that proves the rule for Vijesti, which predominantly underscored Đukanović’s re-
sponsibility for all the wrongdoings. He apparently turned Montenegro into a pri-
vate state, but Key will provide the end of the “period of North Korea”. But the 
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approach of the commercial Vijesti suited Đukanović better. He was now seeing 
Front leaders in everyone. They are all “cawing” Front’s slogan “We or Him”, but 
what they are really saying is “Them or Montenegro” (Vijesti 12.10.). Đukanović 
indicated he was the only one who would defend the integration of Montenegro into 
the Western world from the greedy whose place is on the political margins. While 
the opposition maintained that it was“over” for Đukanović, and that he wouldnot 
“kidnap” Montenegro for a “truck full of smuggled cigarettes”, Đukanović insisted 
they were attacking the very freedom of the state, and that this was not a question of 
who will be in charge but whether Montenegro will survive (Vijesti 13.10.). 
Đukanović responded to all of his opponents’ accusations as if he was talking exclu-
sively to the Democratic Front with the exception of Krivokapić, former Đukanović’s 
partner, who argued he is the biggest problem of the state (Vijesti 14.10),. Being a 
symbol of the opposition, the Front was the embodiment of Đukanović’s favorite 
enemy, the one that will cause chaos on the streets on the election night, take power 
by force and change state decisions in favour of foreign interests. The entire opposi-
tion became hostage to its radical wing, which helped Đukanović claim another 
election win.
Discussion and conclusion
Milo Đukanović managed to get the majority of seats in the parliament. Imaginary 
or real terrorist attempt controversy2, planned for the election day, reduced the turn-
out only by few percent, which means everything that was said about Đukanović 
during the campaign has not changed the minds of a signifi cant number of citizens. 
The usual explanation for this is that a party state uses all its resources to get the 
votes. Maybe it needs a different kind of inference. Comparative overview of com-
mercial and public service media coverage has given us additional insights. RTV 
Vijesti confi rmed the assumption about connection of commercial logic and Eng-
lightenment, which highlighted antagonisms and disorder, corruption of the state, 
possible unrest and electoral fraud. Politics is presented as a dramatic confl ict, in 
which the opposition serves as a disorganizing actor and Đukanović as a corrupt 
usurper. The necessity of change is emphasized, but it does notonly bring hope to 
the viewers: they are also frightened by it.
2 A certain ”terrorist attack“ was apparently stopped on 16th October 2016. The leaders 
of DF are among the people accused in the court of law that they were the organizers 
of the “attack “. It is not known whether this is true to this day, it is a theme of many jokes, 
but the only thing that could be said is that it did not signifi cantly change the election 
results.
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RTV Vijesti deviates from the enlightened commercial logic when problems in the 
economy and questions of state survival are present. Instead of endorsing neoliber-
alism, Vijesti is governed by leftist standards. There is a certain socialist “political 
unconscious”, as a remnant of the previous era, that doubts the privatization of state 
property is well intended. Commercial logic would be more sceptical of the welfare 
state, it would support the tax cuts and free market, but Vijesti fi ghts for the public 
sector. Second paradox is the specifi c position of Đukanović in Vijesti’s narrative. 
Vijesti’s manner of reporting increases antagonisms and polarization and creates a 
semantic death fi eld for Đukanović. However, Vijesti is also a media organization 
steered by the audience. If they want attention of all citizens, they need to frame the 
content that would attract Đukanović’s supporters. While it was expected RTCG 
will suspend most of aggressive content, especially directed against Đukanović, it 
was surprising Vijesti amended the opposition critique by Đukanović’s narrative of 
stability and organized state. Vijesti emphasized critique and used frame of confl ict, 
but it also respected the state as a mortal god. Đukanović had a stabilizing function 
even in the content of the commercial television. He subjugates all, even opposi-
tional subjects. The principles of the Enlightenment and Absolutism are equally 
present in this commercial logic. Đukanović is both a tyrant and the only one who 
can stop the social disorganization. He integrates “subjective opinions into the ob-
jectivity assumed by the spirit in the form of the state” (Habermas, 1989: 120).
The frames proved useful for the analysis of media coverage of the election cam-
paign. A certain model of reality can be constructed by stressing different narrative 
aspects. Vijesti intensify, polarize and simplify events. RTCG is not that analytical 
and investigative as we should expect from the public service. Expert opinions are 
mostly introduced in trivial cases of the electoral register and similar technical prob-
lems, while candidate platforms are rarely dealt with. There were no human interest 
stories that would connect abstract policies with real citizens. The problem of cor-
ruption was presented through politicians’ statements, but the responsibility for the 
charges was rarely personalized. This impersonal critique suggests mediatization of 
politics is rather weak. Public service seems overwhelmed by political logic, staying 
close to the state power, mostly attacking perceived enemies of the state with poten-
tial Russian ties. Democratic Front was portrayed as a fi fth column which may en-
danger social peace on election day. However, RTCG news would usually start with 
a warning about possible chaos and end with a fi rm belief the state will take care of 
it. It does look like abandoning Enlightenment’s media logic by believing the insti-
tutions can do no wrong and that the offi cial narrative is always right, which actu-
ally makes even the commercial media’s journalists a part of the establishment 
(Jamieson & Waldman, 2003: 136).
But maybe it is still a certain kind of mediatization. Problems of social stability and 
statehood usually get media attention, and this is not just a case of public service. 
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Protecting Montenegro from plunder is a common feature. The media love their 
country. Statolatry and leftist defence of welfare state are important for commercial 
and public service media. Even Đukanović, as the undisputed “Master”, fi nds his 
place in the midst of Vijesti’s critical noise. Is this an indicator of the low level of 
mediatization of politics? Within this theoretical framework it does not have to be 
that way. In spite of everything, Đukanović has a stable support. Commercial media 
must respect that, even if it does not understand it. Doubts that the country is so cor-
rupt you can actually buy the votes to gain the parliamentary majority cannot be 
supported by this analysis. It cannot be confi rmed by the commercial media produc-
tion during the campaign. That kind of explanation is clearly insuffi cient. Maybe 
something like that is possible, but it needs a supplement. The critics of the regime 
have to accept the fact that systemic corruption argument cannot fully describe the 
situation.
The assumption that the nation has lost its moral compass falls fl at on the fact there 
is no Habermasian political confrontation. In the West, the narrative of corruption 
is linked to the neoliberal calls for deregulation. Commercial media emphasize the 
inevitability of starving the state beast, like Ronald Reagan once said. Commercial 
media increases the perception of corruption in order to privatize state property and 
create free market. But “socialistically expanded public sphere“ (Habermas, 1989: 
128) is another thing. Montenegro’s Vijesti is a commercial television that defends 
the welfare state. Also, its Enlightenment logic is amended by an Absolutist princi-
ple. Vijesti produces statolatry. Is this a sign of strong political dependence? Only if 
Hegel was a philosopher without integrity. The argument of this paper is based on 
the contextual circumstances that shaped Montenegro’s mediatization of politics in 
a specifi c way. If developed countries need critical mediatization perspective, states 
with questionable sustainability and contradictory socio-economic development 
need even more imaginative dialectics. Habermas’ and Koselleck’s theories seem 
like a constructive way to do it.
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Crnogorska medijatizacija politike: 




Ovaj rad istražuje medijsko oblikovanje političke komunikacije u kampanji za 
parlamentarne izbore u Crnoj Gori 2016. godine. Habermasova ideja o među-
sobnoj povezanosti komercijalnih medija i države dala nam je teorijsku poza-
dinu za ispitivanje napetosti između medija i političke logike. U tom političkom 
sukobu pobjednik određuje pravila društva. Rezultat tog konfl ikta je medijatiza-
cija politike, ako uzmemo da se logika komercijalnog medija temelji na interesi-
ma tržišta. Mediji pripadaju civilnom društvu, stoga, ovaj rad uvodi normativni 
aspekt medijske logike, koji rekonstruira politički sukob. Rad se zatim osvrće na 
društveni kontekst Crne Gore. Dok medijatizacija politike zahtijeva kritičku na-
dogradnju u slučaju razvijenih zemalja, u manje stabilnim državama, društvene 
kontradiktornosti trebale bi utjecati na medijsku logiku na način kako sugerira 
Reinhart Koselleckova teorija. Koselleckova teza jest da je kritika prosvjetitelj-
stva, koja je sadržana u komercijalnim medijima Habermasove liberalne sfere, 
stvorila krizu apsolutističke države, čija je svrha bilo zaustavljanje europskih 
građanskih ratova. To je otvorilo put ka novim društvenim sukobima i dezorga-
nizaciji civilnog društva. Crnogorsko multietničko, postsocijalističko društvo u 
procesu neoliberalne tranzicije nadopunjuje Koselleckovu patogenezu moder-
nosti. Građani rješavaju društvene nesigurnosti rehabilitacijom apsolutističkog 
načela. Usporedna analiza okvira komercijalnih RTV Vijesti i javnog medijskog 
servisa RTCG pokazala je načela prosvjetiteljstva i apsolutizma u medijskoj 
logici oba kanala, što isključuje politički paralelizam kao jedini mogući uzrok. 
Vijesti, koje ovise o postotku gledanosti, predstavljale su Milu Đukanovića kao 
tiranina, ali i kao jamca društvene stabilnosti. Umjesto neoliberalne politike, 
Vijesti su branile javni sektor. Prihvatile su kritiku prosvjetiteljstva i statolatriju 
lijeve političke struje. Zbog toga se integracija Habermasove i Koselleckove 
teorije s medijatizacijom politike pokazala primjerenom.
Ključne riječi:  medijatizacija, političko komuniciranje, medijska logika, izborna 
kampanja, javna sfera
